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What Drives the Comparability Effect of Mandatory IFRS Adoption? 
 
 
ABSTRACT: We investigate the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on the 
comparability of financial accounting information.  Using two comparability proxies 
based on De Franco et al. [2011] and a comparability proxy based on the degree of 
information transfer, our results suggest that the overall comparability effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption is marginal.  We hypothesize that firm-level heterogeneity in 
IFRS compliance explains the limited comparability effect.  To test this conjecture, we 
first hand-collect data on IFRS compliance for a sample of German and Italian firms and 
find that firm-, region-, and country-level incentives systematically shape IFRS 
compliance.  We then use the identified compliance determinants to explain the variance 
in the comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption and find it to vary systematically 
with firm-level compliance determinants, suggesting that only firms with high 
compliance incentives experience substantial increases in comparability. Moreover, we 
document that firms from countries with tighter reporting enforcement experience larger 
IFRS comparability effects, and that public firms adopting IFRS become less comparable 
to local GAAP private firms from the same country. 
Keywords: international accounting, IFRS, comparability, compliance, reporting 
incentives 
JEL Classification: M41, G14, F42 
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1. Introduction 
The mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by 
European listed firms in 2005, accompanied by similar regulatory action in other 
jurisdictions, represents one of the most influential accounting rule changes of recent 
times.  In this paper we investigate whether firms subject to the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS have experienced a material increase in the comparability of financial accounting 
information.  In addition, we identify firm- and country-level determinants that influence 
the comparability change around mandatory IFRS adoption. 
European policy makers state that the reason for mandating a common set of 
accounting standards for listed companies is to “level the playing field” for participants in 
the European capital market by increasing the comparability of financial statements 
prepared by publicly traded companies across Europe (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, 
Par. 1).  The International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) similarly argues that a 
single set of high quality global accounting standards is meant to provide financial market 
participants with comparable financial statements and thereby help them make economic 
decisions (IASC Foundation, Constitution 2(a)).  Increased cross-country comparability is 
also thought to be the main motivation behind the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
(SEC) continuing support for convergence and global accounting standards (SEC, 2010, 
Hail et al. [2010], Joos and Leung [2013]).  To the extent that mandatory adoption of 
IFRS successfully levels the playing field for market participants by introducing high 
quality accounting standards across countries, we should observe two first-order effects: 
an improvement in financial reporting quality (transparency), and an improvement in the 
cross-sectional comparability of financial accounting information (Hail et al. [2010]). 
To date, however, the majority of studies on mandatory IFRS adoption primarily 
investigates only one of the two first-order effects above, namely, changes in financial 
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reporting quality (see Ahmed et al. [2013], Atwood et al. [2011], Landsman et al. 
[2011]), as well as second-order capital-market consequences1 (see Beneish et al. [2012], 
Daske et al. [2008], Horton and Serafeim [2010], Li [2010], Yu [2010]) of the IFRS 
mandate.  Surprisingly, little evidence has been produced on the other important first-
order effect, that is, on changes in cross-country comparability of accounting information. 
Thus, to our knowledge, our study is one of the few attempts to explicitly analyze the 
impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on the cross-country comparability of financial 
accounting information and the only study that investigates firm- as well as country-level 
determinants of the comparability effect. 
We address our research question using an identification strategy that is developed in 
three stages.  First, we try to directly observe the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on 
the comparability of financial accounting information by using two measurement 
constructs based on the work by De Franco et al. [2011].  To identify the impact of IFRS 
adoption, we apply a variant of the standard difference-in-differences analysis (Bertrand 
et al. [2004]; Daske et al. [2008]).  Different from prior studies that model IFRS adoption 
by using a dichotomous treatment, we model IFRS adoption by introducing a 
heterogeneous treatment indicator. To do so, we assume the effect of IFRS adoption on 
the local accounting regime of a given country to vary systematically with the proximity 
of the local accounting regime to IFRS (Bae et al. [2008], Yu [2010]).  We construct our 
sample by calculating average comparability levels across sets of firm pairs stemming 
from the same industry but different countries.  Based on this approach, we are able to 
                                                 
1 By characterizing the capital-market effect of mandatory IFRS adoption as a “second-order effect” we by 
no means imply that this effect is of sub-ordinate economic relevance. “Second-order” simply refers to 
the notion that IFRS adoption potentially causes capital-market effects (second-order) by having an effect 
on accounting outcomes (first-order). It seems hard to imagine that IFRS could have an effect on capital-
markets without affecting accounting outcomes first. 
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predict varying IFRS treatment effects whenever at least one of the two countries that 
form the respective country pair switches to IFRS.2  
Based on this first test, we find only weak evidence of the effect of mandatory IFRS 
adoption on comparability.  Our follow-up analyses aim to shed light on why the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS might have only a limited impact on the comparability of 
financial accounting information.  For a change in accounting standards to have an effect 
on accounting outcomes, compliance with accounting standards is a necessary condition.  
Limited compliance (i.e., firms’ failure to provide information required by accounting 
standards) limits the potential effect of accounting standards reforms.  In addition, limited 
compliance impairs the ability of market participants to compare different firms’ financial 
reports.  Prior work has shown that limited compliance tends to be systematically 
associated with firms’ characteristics, hence suggesting lack of compliance to be a 
response to the incentives that firms face in their respective institutional environments 
(Glaum et al. [2013]).  A study conducted by the staff of the SEC (SEC, 2011) raises 
significant concerns with respect to the cross-country heterogeneity of IFRS application 
and compliance.  Following this idea, limited compliance with IFRS is likely to 
contribute to the weak cross-country comparability effect of IFRS adoption.  Therefore, 
compliance incentives are potential key drivers explaining changes in comparability 
induced by the IFRS mandate. 
To measure firm-level compliance with IFRS and to identify its potential drivers, we 
employ a set of hand-collected data on the IFRS measurement and disclosure choices of 
German and Italian firms.  Our strategy is to identify incentives for compliance with 
accounting standards at the firm, region, and country levels.  Given that within-country 
                                                 
2 This heterogeneity of the IFRS treatment allows us, together with our pre and post IFRS design, to 
effectively address the issue of serial correlation that affects traditional difference-in-differences designs 
(Bertrand et al. [2004]). 
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institutional complementarities are important determinants and tend to shape reporting 
practices over time (Leuz [2010]), using only a sub-sample of countries allows us to dive 
deeper into their institutional determinants.  The selection of Germany and Italy is 
motivated by the following three factors: (a) they are relatively large EU economies 
providing us with a sufficiently large sample of mandatory IFRS adopters, (b) their local 
GAAP regimes exhibit significant differences from each other and from IFRS, so that 
adopting IFRS should have a clear effect on financial accounting measurement and 
disclosure, and (c) they exhibit substantial differences in their institutional infrastructures 
allowing for powerful tests for compliance incentives.  
The results of our second test provide clear evidence that a lack of IFRS compliance 
can be explained by firm-, region-, and country-level factors.  Evidence from 
measurement and disclosure compliance choices of German and Italian IFRS adopting 
firms indicates that compliance incentives are important and shape accounting 
information even when firms share a common set of accounting standards.  In our third 
test, we use the compliance incentives identified in the second test (i.e., auditor type, 
board independence and governmental ownership) to investigate whether the 
comparability effect of IFRS adoption is moderated by compliance incentives.  Following 
a design similar to the first test, we find that compliance incentives increase the overall 
comparability of accounting information and moderate the treatment effect of mandatory 
IFRS adoption on comparability.  Firms with more incentives to comply experience 
systematically larger IFRS comparability effects.  In addition, as enforcement has been 
documented to play an influential role around the time of IFRS adoption (Christensen et 
al. [2013]), we explore the role of enforcement in our setting. We find that country-level 
enforcement complements firm-level compliance incentives in moderating the 
comparability effect of IFRS adoption. 
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We run two additional analyses to assess the robustness of our findings and to 
explore related aspects.  First, we verify that our inferences are robust to the use of an 
alternative measure of accounting comparability based on the degree of cross-country 
information transfer (Yip and Young [2012]).  Second, we test the comparability effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption using a within-country matched sample of private firms as a 
control group.  This allows us to hold the institutional environment constant, addressing a 
prominent concern that applies to studies investigating the effects of IFRS adoption using 
firms from other jurisdictions as a control group.  While we continue to find the 
comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption to be clustered on public firms with 
large compliance incentives, we also document that IFRS adopting public firms become 
less comparable to local GAAP private firms only from the same country.  We take this 
result as consistent with the idea that a different GAAP regime for public and private 
firms within the same country renders these public and private firms less comparable. 
This interpretation hints at a potential cost of IFRS adoption.  
Our paper makes four distinct contributions to the growing body of literature that 
investigates the effects of IFRS adoption.  First, we extend previous work that focuses on 
the overall first-order effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on transparency (e.g., Ahmed 
et al. [2013] for the effect of IFRS on earnings quality, Atwood et al. [2011] for the 
impact of IFRS on earnings informativeness, and Landsman et al. [2011] for the effect of 
IFRS on the information content of earnings) by focusing on the effect of mandatory 
IFRS adoption on the comparability of accounting information (Barth et al. [2012], 
Brochet et al. [2013], Yip and Young [2012]).  Second, in line with the recent call by 
Christensen et al. [2013] for a deeper understanding of the “sources” that drive the effects 
of the IFRS mandate, our paper is the first to explicitly identify firm-level (compliance) 
as well as country-level (enforcement) determinants as important sources of the IFRS 
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comparability effect.  Third, by showing that public firms adopting IFRS become less 
comparable to local GAAP private firms from the same country, we document evidence 
consistent with a potential cost of mandatory IFRS adoption.  Fourth and finally, our 
paper contributes to the methodological challenge of improving the identification of the 
IFRS (comparability) effect by: (i) exploiting cross-country variation in relative distances 
between local GAAP regimes and IFRS (Hail et al. [2010]) to improve the identification 
of the IFRS effect through a heterogeneous treatment indicator, (ii) developing a cash 
flow-based comparability measure that has the advantage to be unaffected by cross-
country differences in capital-market efficiency (Holthausen, [2003]), and (iii) using a 
matched sample of local GAAP private firms from the same country as a control group 
that complements the standard control group of non-IFRS public firms from different 
countries. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief 
discussion of the related literature.  Section 3 presents our research design, sample, and 
results.  Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
2. Related Literature 
While several studies use the comparability argument to justify expected effects of 
mandatory IFRS adoption, thereby indirectly testing for a comparability effect (e.g., Yu 
[2010]; Wu and Zhang [2010]; Defond et. al [2011]; Ozkan et al. [2012]), to date very 
few studies have looked at the direct effect of the adoption on accounting comparability. 
Barth et al. [2012] investigate whether the adoption of IFRS by non-U.S. firms 
increases the comparability of accounting information with respect to U.S. firms applying 
U.S. GAAP.  The authors document that following IFRS adoption, IFRS firms and U.S. 
GAAP firms exhibit higher accounting system and value relevance comparability 
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although some differences still persist.  Using a sample of U.K. firms, Brochet et al. 
[2013] document a decrease in information asymmetries following the introduction of 
IFRS.  They link this positive capital-market consequence to firm-level changes in 
comparability and interpret this as evidence for an increase in accounting comparability.  
Wang [2011] looks at cross-country information transfer to capture the comparability 
effect of IFRS adoption.  She finds for the post IFRS adoption period larger information 
transfers and interprets this evidence as indicative of IFRS increasing comparability.  The 
paper most closely related to our study is Yip and Young [2012].  Using a sample of 17 
European countries and three proxies to measure comparability (i.e., the similarity of 
accounting function, the degree of information transfer, and the information content of 
earnings and book value) they provide evidence of increased accounting comparability 
following IFRS adoption.  
In sum, the direct evidence on the IFRS effect on accounting comparability is 
limited.  Our study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first that analyzes the impact of 
mandatory IFRS adoption on the cross-country comparability of financial accounting 
information by investigating its firm- as well as country-level determinants.   
3. Empirical Analyses 
3.1 IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 
In order capture accounting comparability, we start by following the methodology 
introduced by De Franco et al. [2011].  The authors assess the comparability of financial 
accounting information by measuring the similarity of the earnings-return relation for 
subsamples of U.S. firms grouped by industry.  They use the coefficient estimates of 
quarterly firm-specific time series regressions of earnings on returns to predict earnings 
of the investigated firms.  In addition, the estimated coefficients of other firms within the 
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same industry are used with the returns of the investigated firms to produce alternative 
earnings predictions based on the coefficients of the industry peer firms.  The smaller the 
average absolute forecast errors of these different earnings predictions, the more 
comparable the accounting earnings of the respective firm to its peers.  De Franco et al. 
[2011] limit the measure to the most comparable peers and average their measure over 
the last four calendar years, effectively basing their measure on 8 years of quarterly data.  
While De Franco et al. [2011] have the possibility to use long firm-specific time series of 
quarterly data from firms of the same institutional environment, our setting requires some 
adjustments to their methodology that are very similar to the modifications applied by 
Yip and Young [2012] and Brochet et al. [2013].  First, we use annual data as cross-
country differences in reporting frequency and lack of quarterly data availability make 
the quarterly data approach infeasible in our international setting;3 second, our post IFRS 
period is limited to four years of data; and finally, we are contrasting comparability 
effects across different countries whose markets possibly exhibit variation in information 
efficiency. 
In order to adjust our methodology accordingly, we measure the comparability of 
accounting information for a given country-industry group (based on its two-digit SIC 
code) with the same industry group from other countries.  We assess accounting 
                                                 
3   To verify that using annual data for constructing our comparability measures does not drive our results, 
we construct a sample based on semiannual data. For this, we collect data from Datastream and 
Compustat Global. A balanced sample with observations for the pre and post IFRS period in principle 
requires consecutive interim financial reporting data over the period 2001 to 2008. We settle with 
requiring at least six semiannual observations for each firm and four-year period to balance the sample 
size with the benefits of using interim data. To augment our semiannual observations, we combine 
quarterly reporting observations to semiannual observations by appropriately combining two accounting 
data from two consecutive quarters. This approach yields a final sample of 6,719 firms. Roughly two-
thirds of these observations are from the U.S. and Japan and many European IFRS adopting countries 
are not well represented in the sample. However, we repeat our analysis for this reduced sample and 
find our main inferences to be qualitatively unchanged. Also, we verify that our comparability measures 
based on annual data are consistently linked to firm-level measures of the information environment 
(analyst following, forecast accuracy, forecast dispersion, and bid-ask spreads) in an economically 
meaningful way. 
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comparability separately for a 4-year time period prior to IFRS adoption (2001-2004) and 
post IFRS adoption (2005-2008).  We measure comparability at the industry level 
separately for pairs of countries and our sample is thus organized by industry, country, 
peer-country and pre/post accounting regime change.4  
For each firm within a country-industry group, we estimate the following two models 
separately for the two time periods pre and post IFRS adoption: 
(1) ܰܫܤܧ௣,௜,௧ ൌ ߙ௣,௜,଴ ൅ ߙ௣,௜,ଵܴܧ ௣ܶ,௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௣,௜ 
, (2) ܣܥܥ_ܶܣ௣,௜,௧ ൌ ߚ௣,௜,଴ ൅ ߚ௣,௜,ଵܥܨܱ_ܶܣ௣,௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௣,௜ 
where p indicates the period (pre or post IFRS), i denotes the firm, t is a time indicator for 
the year, NIBE stands for net income before extraordinary items deflated by lagged 
market capitalization, RET stands for the fiscal year end buy and hold return, NIBE_TA 
indicates net income before extraordinary items deflated by lagged total assets, ACC_TA 
stands for total accruals deflated by lagged total assets, and CFO_TA stands for cash flow 
from continuing operations deflated by lagged total assets.  Resulting coefficients from 
estimating models (1) and (2) are truncated at the top 1 and 99 percentiles of their 
distributions.5 
Model (1) closely resembles the approach of De Franco et al. [2011].  As reliance on 
stable levels of market efficiency across countries and time might be problematic, we use 
an alternative modeling approach inspired by Ball and Shivakumar [2006] to capture the 
same notion of mapping of economic events while avoiding the potentially confounding 
effects of differences in market efficiency.  As the mapping of cash flow into accruals is a 
core feature of the financial reporting process (Dechow [1994]) that substantially affects 
                                                 
4 Additional details about the sample structure and an illustrative example are provided in Appendix 1. 
5 Total accruals are calculated as change in current assets minus change in current liabilities minus 
change in cash plus change in current debt minus depreciation and amortization minus change in 
provisions. Cash flow from operations is calculated as net income before extraordinary items minus 
total accruals. 
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the volatility of earnings as well as their predictability and persistence (Dichev and Tang 
[2009]), model (2) captures a central aspect of the accounting recognition process. In 
addition, it has the advantage of capturing economic events via cash flows and therefore 
rules out any concerns about differences in market efficiency.6  The firm-period-level 
coefficients of each model are then used to predict earnings for the investigated firm.  In 
addition, the coefficients of each industry-peer firm (from the same and different 
countries) are used to produce alternative earnings predictions.  The absolute difference 
of these earnings predictions is averaged across country, peer-country, and industry to 
produce our comparability measure: 
(3) ܦܸܭܥܱܯ ௣ܲ,௖௜,௖௝,௞ ൌ െ
∑ หߙ௣,௜,଴ ൅ ߙ௣,௜,ଵܴܧ ௣ܶ,௜ െ ൫ߙ௣,௝,଴ ൅ ߙ௣,௝,ଵܴܧ ௣ܶ,௜൯ห௜,௝
n௣,௖௜,௖௝,௞  ,
where DKVCOMP indicates our De Franco et al. [2011] based comparability measure 
derived from estimations of model (1), ci stands for the country of firm i, cj stands for the 
country of firm j, k stands for the two-digit SIC industry code of firms i and j, and np,ci,cj,k 
indicates the number of available firm pairs within each industry k with firm i from 
country ci and firm j from country cj and, in case of ci = cj, i ≠ j. All other variables are 
as previously defined. 
Following the same approach, we calculate our alternative cash flow-based 
comparability construct (CFCOMP) as: 
(4) ܥܨܥܱܯ ௣ܲ,௖௜,௖௝,௞ ൌ െ
∑ หߚ௣,௜,଴ ൅ ߚ௣,௜,ଵܥܨܱ_ܶܣ௣,௜ െ ൫ߚ௣,௝,଴ ൅ ߚ௣,௝,ଵܥܨܱ_ܶܣ௣,௜൯ห௜,௝
n௣,௖௜,௖௝,௞  ,
                                                 
6 While conceptually, cash flow from operations should be unaffected by accounting standards, the 
indirect method of cash flow calculation and the separation of cash flow from investments from cash 
flow from operations introduces a modest impact of accounting standards (IAS 7 in the case of IFRS) 
on the measurement of cash flow from operations. However, rules for calculating cash flow from 
operations are remarkably similar around the world. Thus, we assume the impact of different accounting 
regimes on the cash flow from operations to be marginal. 
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where all variables are as previously defined.  In addition, we calculate rank-based 
measures of DKVCOMP and CFCOMP (R_DKVCOMP and R_CFCOMP) where we 
percentage-rank each absolute difference of earnings predictions for each i,j firm pair, 
separately for each industry group.  These ranks are then averaged across period, country, 
peer-country, and industry group.  Using this ranking approach we are able to investigate 
non-parametric effects of shifts in the country distributions of comparability pre and post 
IFRS adoption. 
We use the quasi-experimental setting of mandatory IFRS adoption as our treatment.  
In line with prior literature, we assume the treatment decision to be exogenous in the 
sense that we do not control for the potential self-selection of countries into the treatment 
group.  As our treatment is assigned at the country level, our main level of analysis lies 
on the comparability effects at the country-peer-country level meaning that we measure 
comparability at the industry level separately for pairs of countries. 
When we model the determinants of comparability for a pair of countries, we control 
for country-level and industry-level determinants of comparability by including country-, 
peer-country-, and industry-level fixed effects.7  We assume the comparability of 
accounting information between two countries to be influenced by the similarity of their 
respective GAAP regimes, meaning that two countries with similar GAAP regimes 
should have firms with more comparable accounting information.  Thus, our main 
independent variable of interest is the difference of accounting regimes across pairs of 
countries.  This strategy enables us to assess the effect of the IFRS treatment by modeling 
the change of country-peer-country-level GAAP proximity caused by IFRS adoption.  
While other research in the area mostly models the IFRS treatment as a binary variable, 
                                                 
7 This controls for, e.g., differences in country-level institutions.  For example, a fixed effect for country 
A will control for the effect of the enforcement system of country A that reduces the variance of 
accounting outcomes in country A. 
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our identification strategy builds on the systematic variance of the IFRS regime shock 
across countries. Hence, we are able to exploit the heterogeneous nature of the IFRS 
treatment for our identification (similar to Yu [2010]).  We identify the effect of IFRS 
adoption by estimating a change model that captures the effect of IFRS induced changes 
in GAAP proximity on changes in accounting comparability across time.  By using a 
change setup based on two observations pre and post, we avoid the serial correlation 
problem that potentially affects difference-in-differences studies based on panels with 
long time series (Bertrand et al. [2004]). 
In the second set of tests, we turn our focus to the degree to which adopting firms 
comply with IFRS and the determinants of compliance across firms and countries in order 
to identify potential firm-level variables that are likely to moderate the overall 
comparability effect.  To do so, we use a hand-collected sample of accounting 
measurement and disclosure compliance data of German and Italian IFRS adopting firms 
and investigate whether firm-, region- and country-level incentives explain the 
differences in compliance that we document. 
The third set of tests follows a design similar to the first test, but builds on the 
identified compliance determinants from the second set of tests (i.e., auditor type, board 
independence and governmental ownership) to investigate whether compliance incentives 
moderate the comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption.  Also, we assess the 
moderating effect of country-level enforcement by estimating a set of change models.8 
                                                 
8 In addition to these main tests, we conduct a set of additional analyses that are discussed in sections 3.7 
and 3.8. 
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3.2 SAMPLE SELECTION 
Our first and last sets of tests focus on publicly traded firms from 29 different countries 
(14 IFRS adopters and 15 non-IFRS adopters) and cover the period 2001 to 2008.  The 
sample selection starts with U.S. firms (for which we use CRSP and Compustat data) and 
all firms in the Worldscope universe of countries that have more than 100 public firms 
followed by Worldscope.  From this initial sample, we delete all firm-year observations 
that correspond to voluntary IFRS adoption as voluntary IFRS adopters are likely to have 
different reporting incentives from those of mandatory adopters (Ashbaugh [2001]) and 
thus make the IFRS treatment endogenous to firm-level incentives.9  We further delete 
firm-year observations for which data necessary for estimating our comparability 
measures are absent.  Since our main focus lies on the identification of comparability 
effects across time, we require a balanced panel of firms to rule out changes in 
comparability across time that are caused by sample changes.  In addition, we require 
each country to have at least 50 firms with sufficient data.  This procedure yields a base 
sample of 78,784 firm-year observations (9,848 firms) to construct our comparability 
measures.10  Descriptive statistics for both treatment and control samples can be found in 
Panel A of Table 1.  We estimate our models (1) and (2) for each firm-period in our 
sample, yielding a maximum of 19,690 coefficients per model.  Based on the coefficients 
and the methodology discussed above, we calculate our comparability metrics at the 
                                                 
9  Since in some countries voluntary adoption of IFRS was permitted before 2005, our sample of 
mandatory IFRS adopters could be potentially subject to a reverse selection issue. Given the relatively 
high frequency of voluntary adopters in Germany, this issue is likely to be relevant for German firms in 
particular. To assess the robustness of our findings, we repeat our main tests excluding German firms 
and find our inferences to be qualitatively unchanged. 
10 To verify that the results of our analyses are insensitive to sample composition, we repeat our main tests 
using different samples: (i) excluding observations from the U.S., Japan, and the U.K.; (ii) restricting 
the maximum number of observations for each country to 100 randomly chosen observations; (iii)  
excluding observations from European countries; (iv) excluding financial institutions. While the results 
become weaker when we focus on non-European observations, the tenor of our findings is not affected 
by these design choices. 
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period, country, peer-country, and industry level.  The resulting descriptive statistics are 
disclosed in Panels B and C of Table 1.11  Throughout the analysis higher values of our 
measures indicate that the financial accounting information of the two respective 
countries for a given period and industry are more comparable with each other. 
Our second set of tests requires hand-collection of financial reporting and 
governance data.  Given our interest in identifying country- and firm-level determinants 
of comparability while balancing the data collection costs, we study a sub-sample of 
German and Italian firms.  The sample comprises all 2006 German and Italian IFRS 
mandatory adopters.  The total sample size is 289 observations. 
For our third set of tests, we require additional data to compute our compliance 
incentives proxy.  We obtain worldwide data on board independence and governmental 
ownership from the Orbis database published by Bureau van Dijk (BvDEP) and Risk-
Metrics (formerly IRRC), and auditor type from Worldscope. Requiring this additional 
data reduces our firm-level sample to 54,368 firm-year observations (6,796 firms). 
3.3 BASE TEST FOR THE COMPARABILITY EFFECT OF MANDATORY IFRS 
ADOPTION 
In order to verify our identification strategy we first focus on the pre IFRS adoption 
period (2001-2004).  If our comparability measures capture differences in financial 
accounting regimes, they should be systematically linked to the proximity of GAAP 
across countries.  In order to test whether this is the case, we estimate the following 
model on the pre IFRS section of the sample: 
                                                 
11 Conceptually, 29 countries and 73 two-digit SIC industry groups would allow for a total of29*29*73 = 
61,393 observations for each period.  However, we require at least three firms for each country, peer-
country, industry group reducing the sample to 16,820 observations covering all countries and 69 
industries. 
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(5) 
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൅෍߮௞ܫܰܦܷܴܵܶ ௞ܻ ൅
௞
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൅ ߝ௖௜,௖௝,௞	 
,
where COMPM stands for the comparability measure used (either DKVCOMP, 
R_DKVCOMP, CFCOMP, or R_CFCOMP), COUNTRY is a series of ci country fixed 
effects, PCOUNTRY is a series of cj peer-country fixed effects, and INDUSTRY is a 
series of industry fixed effects based on two-digit SIC codes.  SMCTRY is a binary 
variable that takes the value of one if ci = cj, indicating that the comparability of financial 
accounting regimes within one country is observed.  As prior literature indicates that the 
financial accounting regime is not only influenced by accounting standards but also by 
other institutional factors, we assume that, ceteris paribus, firms from the same country 
have higher levels of financial accounting comparability.  GAAP_PROX is based on Bae 
et al. [2008] who build their GAAP proximity measure on the information available in the 
international GAAP survey study by Street [2001].  This measure captures country-pair 
GAAP distance by counting differences between two countries based on the GAAP 
differences measure presented in Bae et al. [2008: Table 1].  We define GAAP_PROX as 
the negative number of differences divided by the maximum number of differences 
observed across all country pairs, so that larger values of GAAP_PROX indicate higher 
similarity of GAAP across countries.  If both countries are the same, GAAP_PROX takes 
the value of zero, i.e. the maximum value of GAAP proximity. We expect the coefficients 
of SMCTRY and GAAP_PROX to be significantly positive for our pre IFRS sub-sample.  
The results of the respective tests are reported in Panel A of Table 2.  All reported 
coefficients show the predicted sign with six out of eight being significant at conventional 
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levels.  We take this as evidence indicating that our identification strategy is sufficiently 
powerful to detect the effect of financial accounting standards on financial accounting 
comparability. However, the documented effect is not very large in economic terms. An 
increase in GAAP_PROX as measured by its interquartile range translates into a rank 
increase of 2.3 percentage points in comparability. 
The next test directly investigates the IFRS treatment effect on comparability.12  To 
use each country-peer-country pair as its own control, we estimate the following change 
model: 
(6) 
߂ሺܥܱܯܲܯ௖௜,௖௝,௞ሻ
ൌ෍ߜ௖௜ܥܱܷܴܰܶ ௖ܻ௜ ൅
௖௜
෍ߜ௖௝ܲܥܱܷܴܰܶ ௖ܻ௝
௖௝
൅෍߮௞ܫܰܦܷܴܵܶ ௞ܻ ൅
௞
ߛଵܵܯܥܴܶ ௖ܻ௜,௖௝ ൅ ߛଶܫܨܴܵ_ܧܨܨܧܥ ௖ܶ௜,௖௝
൅ ߝ௖௜,௖௝,௞ 
,
where COMPM) stands for the change in the respective comparability measure (either 
DKVCOMP, R_DKVCOMP, CFCOMP, or R_CFCOMP) from the pre period to the post 
period, with a positive value indicating an increase in comparability.  IFRS_EFFECT 
captures the change in GAAP_PROX caused by the adoption of IFRS in the treatment 
countries.  Since the adoption of IFRS has affected the GAAP of some treatment 
countries to become more dissimilar relative to some control countries, values of the 
IFRS_EFFECT can be negative as well as positive.  If the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
has an effect on the international comparability of financial accounting information, we 
                                                 
12 In unreported sensitivity analyses we also include additional control variables (mean size, mean book-
to-market, standard deviation of earnings and cash flows) into our (modified) versions of models (5) 
and (6).  Also, for model (6), we use changes instead of levels. Our inferences are insensitive to any of 
these design choices. 
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expect the coefficient of IFRS_EFFECT to be significantly positive.  We make no 
prediction for SMCTRY. 
As it can be assessed from Panel B of Table 2, we do not find a robust treatment 
effect of IFRS across our models.  The relevant coefficient has the predicted sign in three 
out of four cases ((R_DKVCOMP), (CFCOMP), and (R_CFCOMP)) and 
significantly so in two regressions ((R_DKVCOMP) and (R_CFCOMP)).  In 
economic terms, an IFRS-induced increase in GAAP_PROX (measured by its 
interquartile range) leads to a 1.2 percentage points rank increase in comparability 
(measured by R_CFCOMP).  Based on this analysis, we conclude that the overall effect 
of mandatory IFRS adoption on the comparability of financial accounting information 
appears to be marginal.   
3.4 COMPLIANCE TESTS 
Our second series of tests investigates the cross-country determinants of accounting 
compliance.  The expected comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption is based on 
the assumption that companies comply with the new set of rules.  Lax compliance is 
consistent with managerial incentives having a predominant role in shaping accounting 
outcomes.  As managerial incentives vary both systematically and unsystematically 
across firms, we expect them to reduce the comparability effect of mandatory IFRS 
adoption.  Our strategy therefore is to identify different incentives for compliance with 
accounting standards (at the firm, region, and country level).  We argue that firms with 
high incentives to comply are the ones that are likely to experience more pronounced 
comparability effects from IFRS adoption. 
Using a unique dataset on the 2006 accounting measurement and disclosure 
compliance of German and Italian firms that are publicly listed since at least 2004 and 
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that mandatorily adopted IFRS in 2005, we first investigate whether there are significant 
differences in accounting measurement and disclosure compliance across countries for 
these firms.  To do so, we hand-collect accounting measurement and disclosure 
compliance data from the 2006 financial reports of all firms that meet our data 
requirements (136 German and 153 Italian firms).13  A summary of the main features of 
the instrument used to hand-collect compliance data is presented in Appendix 2. Further 
details on this instrument, the data collection process, and the setting being investigated 
are available in the online Appendix to this paper.14 
Table 3 presents results on accounting measurement compliance in Panel A and 
disclosure compliance in Panel B.  In Panel A, we report stated accounting measurement 
compliance separately for German and Italian firms for the following IFRS standards: 
IFRS 2 (Share-based Payment), IAS 11 (Construction Contracts), IAS 17 (Leases), IAS 
19 (Employee Benefits), IAS 36 (Impairment of Assets), IAS 38 (Intangible Assets), and 
IAS 39 (Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement).  While we generally find 
the observed accounting measurement compliance to be similarly high across countries, 
we find significant differences with respect to IAS 38 and IAS 39, with German firms 
showing lower compliance than Italian firms.15   
                                                 
13 To mitigate possible sample selection issues, we also collect compliance data from the group financial 
reports of German voluntary adopters and use propensity score matching to match German firms to 
similar Italian firms. We replicate our analysis by comparing the Italian firms with a matched sample of 
153 German firms (116 of which voluntary adopters) and check that our results and inferences stay 
unchanged. 
14 The online appendix is available at http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/rewe/research/cg_online_app.pdf. 
15 Looking more closely at the detailed response data (untabulated), we find that German firms tend a) to 
expense development costs, and b) not to recognize the fair value of derivative financial instruments on 
their balance sheets.  These non-compliant measurement choices are consistent with German firms 
exhibiting a general tendency towards historical cost (Christensen and Nikolaev, 2013).  We find a 
similar result for the German matched sample, although with a somewhat lower level of significance.  
In contrast, the German matched firms exhibit a higher level of IFRS 2 measurement compliance than 
Italian firms. 
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In Panel B, we report disclosure compliance scores separately for German and Italian 
firms for the same standards as in Panel A as well as for IAS 33 (Earnings Per Share).  
Comparing the disclosure compliance scores with the accounting measurement 
compliance scores, we find that disclosure compliance is significantly lower than 
measurement compliance (this finding is in line with prior literature; see, e.g., Street and 
Gray [2001]).  Further, we find much more cross-country variance in disclosure 
compliance.  This variance does not lean towards one country, however: Italian firms 
exhibit significantly higher disclosure compliance for IFRS 2, IAS 33, IAS 36 and IAS 
39, while German firms score significantly better for IAS 17 and IAS 38.   
To investigate the within-country variance of compliance and to identify potential 
determinants of the IFRS effect on accounting comparability, we then focus on 
determinants of compliance.  We limit our analysis to disclosure compliance as 
measurement compliance tends to be generally high and exhibits low cross-sectional 
variation.  We perform both a within-country and a pooled-sample analysis on our 
German and Italian data.  To construct our dependent variable, CSCORE, we average all 
disclosure scores for each of the 136 German and 153 Italian firms.  We estimate country 
sample and interacted pooled sample versions of the following disclosure compliance 
determinant model:16 
                                                 
16 To address possible omitted variable concerns, we also estimated alternative versions of this model that 
included leverage, index membership, number of years since the initial public offering, seasoned public 
offerings (SPO), American Depositary Receipts (ADR), foreign listing, foreign sales, and analyst 
following as additional independent variables.  These additional variables do not change our inferences. 
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,
where CSCORE is average firm-level compliance, calculated using the instrument 
presented in Appendix 2.  The subscripts i, and j denote firm and industry.  INDUSTRY 
is a set of one-digit SIC industry dummy variables.17  SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
total assets.  ROA is return on assets, calculated by dividing earnings before interest and 
taxes by beginning of fiscal year total assets.  MTB is market capitalization divided by 
book value of equity.  FREQ_LOSSES is the frequency of losses, defined as the 
proportion of the previous five fiscal years in which the firm reported negative earnings.  
INDEP_BOARD is a dummy variable for board independence that for the Italian sample 
is coded one if the number of independent directors divided by the total number of board 
members is above the mean and zero otherwise, and for the German sample is coded one 
if the head of the supervisory board was not the former chief executive officer of the 
respective firm and zero otherwise.  INSTOWN is a dummy variable indicating 
significant institutional ownership (above 2%) in the firm.  GOVOWN is a dummy 
variable indicating whether a governmental body has a stake in the firm.  FAMBUS is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the firm is controlled by a managing family.  BIG4 is 
a dummy variable indicating whether the firm’s financial statements have been audited 
by a one of the four leading audit suppliers of the respective country.  LD_REGION is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the respective German (Italian) firm is domiciled in 
                                                 
17  While in all the other tests we define industry with two-digit SIC codes, industry groups in the German 
and Italian firms’ compliance analysis are based on one-digit SIC codes due to the limited sample sizes. 
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the eastern regions of Germany (southern regions of Italy) based on the location of its 
headquarters.   
Descriptive statistics for the potential determinants of differences in disclosure 
compliance as well as the control variables are presented in Panel A of Table 4.  Panel B 
of Table 4 reports correlations among the dependent and independent variables.  
Compliance for Italian firms is significantly positively related with size, profitability, 
growth, audit quality, institutional ownership, and southern origin.  For the German 
sample, disclosure compliance is significantly positively associated with size, 
independent board members, and audit quality.  
Table 4, Panel C presents the multivariate results of model (5).  The fit of the model 
is comparable to those of similar studies (e.g., Street and Gray [2001], Glaum et al. 
[2013]). Also, the findings are economically significant. As an example, firms with a big4 
auditor in Italy tend to have a compliance score that is about 24 percentage points higher 
than their non-big4 peers.18 Taken together, these results clearly indicate that both in 
Germany and Italy, firm-level incentives influence compliance.  Size, board 
independence, governmental ownership and auditor type significantly influence 
accounting compliance. In addition, the pooled-sample analysis shows that the 
coefficients on profitability, governmental ownership, dominant auditor and less 
developed region vary significantly between Italy and Germany.  This result indicates 
that more profitable firms generally tend to provide more forthcoming disclosures in Italy 
than in Germany, potentially because German firms tend to face higher levels of 
competition (Djankov et al. [2002]), making proprietary costs of disclosure more relevant 
for profitable firms.  In addition, the interplay between governmental ownership and firm 
                                                 
18  Since we do not control for the (unobserved) determinants of auditor choice, this effect should not be 
interpreted as causal. 
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compliance seems to be different between the two countries: While in Germany, in line 
with our expectations, governmental ownership is related to higher compliance levels, the 
opposite seems to be true in Italy.  This is consistent with a monitoring function of the 
German government and an entrenched position of the Italian government in Italian firms 
(La Porta et al. [1999]).  The impact of high quality auditing on compliance also appears 
to be more pronounced in Italy, possibly because Italian audit firms tend to be more 
heterogeneous in terms of quality than German firms (Ashbaugh and Warfield [2003]).  
For Italy we find a robust negative impact of the geographical region on compliance, 
consistent with the Italian business environment being geographically diverse 
(Gerschenkron [1955], Eckaus [1961], Terrasi [1999]) with Southern regions being 
characterized by informal governance institutions that are expected to reduce the demand 
for disclosure compliance.  On the other hand, we do not find a similar effect for 
Germany although, subsequent to reunification, a lack of convergence between the less 
developed East and the more industrialized West led to considerable disparity in the 
levels of income, investment, and productivity (Boltho et al. [1999]).  We view this 
finding as indicating that it is not the overall economic situation of a less developed 
region that drives differences in compliance; rather, the relationship-driven institutions 
that Southern Italy has developed over centuries (and that are unavailable in Eastern 
Germany) act as an alternative communication device for corporations.19   
                                                 
19  In untabulated robustness checks, we re-run our analysis by contrasting the Italian sample with a pooled 
sample of German voluntary and mandatory adopters.  Interestingly, German firms show overall higher 
compliance than Italian firms.  Based on the insight from the geographical region results, this finding 
might be driven by different cultural attitudes towards compliance in general.  Our findings are also in 
line with the common-held belief that Italian firms tend to “label adopt” IFRS without any serious 
commitment to transparency because, in a strong insider system like Italy, information asymmetries are 
mainly resolved via means other than publicly disclosing accounting information.  This finding is 
consistent with the argument supported by Daske et al. [2013] and might also be driven by the German 
enforcement system being more efficient than its Italian counterpart. We explore this intuition in 
subsequent analyses. Finally, our results show that voluntary adopters provide better disclosure 
compliance than late adopters. 
 23 
Taken together, the tests indicate that IFRS compliance differs systematically due to 
determinants that vary at the firm, region, and country levels. Since compliance is a 
necessary condition for comparability effects of accounting reforms to materialize, these 
determinants might be important moderating variables for the comparability effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption.  Based on the analysis presented in this section, we expect 
large firms with dominant auditors and independent boards to be more compliant.  The 
final series of main tests will investigate whether the compliance determinants identified 
in this section moderate the comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption. 
3.5 THE COMPARABILITY EFFECT OF MANDATORY IFRS ADOPTION: THE 
MODERATING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE DETERMINANTS 
In order to directly test for the impact of compliance on the comparability effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption, one would have to obtain firm-level data on compliance for 
the broad international sample used in the first series of tests.  In an untabulated analysis, 
we use the CSCORE measure of the compliance test to see whether for the German and 
Italian firms of our sample, compliance has an impact on comparability.  Based on a 
sample of 366 observations, we find CSCORE to moderate the comparability effect of 
IFRS for our ranked comparability measures.  While this test is low-powered because of 
the small sample size, we take this result as first-level evidence that the comparability 
effect of mandatory IFRS adoption is centered on firms with high levels of IFRS 
compliance. 
To investigate whether this finding holds for the full sample, we use the results of 
the compliance determinants test to construct a measure for compliance that is based on 
the first principal component of the compliance determinants that turned out to be 
significant in the second test: auditor type, board independence and governmental 
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ownership.  We then test the impact of these compliance determinants on the IFRS 
comparability effect for the full sample.20 We break up the observations from the first 
series of tests into smaller groups that are constructed by period (pre and post IFRS 
adoption), country pair, industry, and ranks of our compliance construct.  This, at the 
same time, increases (because of the finer groups) and decreases (because newly 
constructed groups fall below the size threshold of three observations per group) the 
number of observations. 
In the analysis presented in Table 5, our compliance measure (COMPLIANCE) is 
based on firm-level values of the first principal component explained above. We 
construct three ranks.  If both firms have a first principal component measure above the 
median, then our ranked metric COMPLIANCE takes the value of 1. If one firm has a 
first principal component measure above and the other one has a first principal 
component measure below the median, COMPLIANCE takes the value of 0.5.  If both 
firms have first principal component measures below the median, COMPLIANCE takes 
the value of zero.  Based on these ranks, we group our firm pairs into groups defined by 
country pair, industry, and compliance level.  We then fully interact our base models (5) 
and (6) with COMPLIANCE. 
Panel A of Table 5 provides firm-pair-level correlations for our dependent variables, 
the input variables of the first principal component analysis, the resulting first principal 
component compliance measure, and firm size.  Based on the De Franco et al. [2011] 
comparability measures, it seems that all compliance incentives are positively related to 
                                                 
20 We refrain from using size as an additional input variable as size usually captures a myriad of different 
firm-level characteristics and thus it seems hard to unambiguously interpret any effect related to size. To 
verify the construct validity of our compliance incentives proxy, we repeat our tests including size in 
our first principal component analysis as well as using alternative first principle components (i.e., 
including and excluding in turn governmental ownership, board independence, and auditor type) and 
find our main findings to be robust.   
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comparability.  For our cash flow-based variant of that comparability measure the results 
appear more mixed.  It also seems important to note that overall larger firms seem to 
exhibit higher levels of comparability. 
Turning to the multivariate evidence presented in Panel B, we see that for all four 
specifications of comparability, higher compliance incentives are linked to more 
comparable financial accounting information.  In addition, we find that, in general, 
stronger compliance incentives strengthen the link between accounting standards 
similarity and comparability: For firm pairs with strong compliance incentives, 
accounting standards seem to have a larger influence on comparability.  This finding is 
consistent with firms with higher compliance incentives being more compliant with 
GAAP on average and thus with GAAP differences across countries having a larger 
impact on financial accounting comparability for these firms. 
Panel C reports the results of the difference-in-differences test for the effect of IFRS 
adoption.  We focus our discussion on the impact of IFRS_EFFECT.  As can be assessed 
from the interaction of IFRS_EFFECT with COMPLIANCE, the effect of mandatory 
IFRS adoption on comparability seems to be completely moderated by compliance 
incentives: The larger the compliance incentives, the more pronounced the IFRS effect.  
The relevant coefficient has the predicted sign and is significant at conventional levels for 
each of the four dependent variables.  Based on this analysis, we conclude that the overall 
marginal comparability effect of IFRS adoption seems to be centered on firms with large 
compliance incentives.  The results for the Wald-test that tests for the combined 
significance of the main effect IFRS_EFFECT together with the interaction effect 
IFRS_EFFECT*COMPLIANCE indicate that the firm-to-firm matches, where both firms 
have above median compliance incentives, experience a significantly positive IFRS 
adoption effect on comparability regardless of which specification of comparability we 
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use. In order to gauge the economic significance of this finding, we estimate the 
magnitude of the comparability effect using a standard univariate difference-in-
differences approach.  For the full sample, adopting IFRS is related to a statistically 
insignificant rank increase in comparability of 0.7 percentage points, based on an average 
rank of 50.6% of the treatment sample prior to IFRS adoption. Firms with high 
compliance incentives instead experience a statistically significant rank increase in 
comparability of 6.5 percentage points based on an average rank of 56.1% of this 
treatment sub-sample prior to IFRS adoption.  We interpret this as an economically 
sizable effect. 
3.6 THE COMPARABILITY EFFECT OF MANDATORY IFRS ADOPTION: THE 
ROLE OF ENFORCEMENT 
Prior literature has documented that reporting enforcement plays an important role for the 
observed liquidity effects around the IFRS mandate (Christensen et al. [2013]).  While 
the main focus of our study is on firm-level determinants, and thus we use an 
identification strategy that allows us to use country-level fixed effects to control for 
country-level determinants of comparability, we also explore whether country-level 
differences in enforcement have an impact on the comparability effect of mandatory 
IFRS adoption.  To do so, we estimate a variant of model (6) which does not include 
country and peer-country fixed effects21 but includes proxies for levels 
(BPT_ENF_SCORE) and changes ((BPT_ENF_SCORE)) in reporting enforcement 
based on Brown et al. [2013] and interacts these proxies with the treatment effect of IFRS 
                                                 
21 We drop country fixed effects from the analysis to allow the country-level main effect of enforcement to 
manifest itself in the data. The fact that enforcement effects are only sizeable once country-level fixed 
effects are omitted from the analysis indicates that we are unable to separate a potentially moderating 
effect of enforcement on the comparability effect of IFRS from other unobservable country-level effects 
on comparability. 
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(IFRS_EFFECT). 22  Results from this test are reported in Table 6.  While our firm-level 
measure of compliance incentives still continues to moderate the comparability effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption, we also observe a significant impact of the level of 
enforcement on the comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption, as can be assessed 
by the coefficient for the interaction of BPT_ENF_SCORE and IFRS_EFFECT.  We 
interpret the negative main effect of enforcement levels as indicating that firms from 
countries with high levels of enforcement experience on average smaller changes in 
comparability.  This is also consistent with the positive and significant coefficients on the 
main effect that captures the effect of change in enforcement for the return-based 
comparability measures. 
We conclude from this additional analysis that country-level reporting enforcement 
has a positive impact on the comparability of accounting information and that this effect 
is complementary to the moderating effect of compliance incentives.23 
3.7 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES: COMPARABILITY MEASURE BASED ON THE 
DEGREE OF INFORMATION TRANSFER 
To mitigate potential measurement error concerns with the comparability construct 
developed by De Franco et al. [2011], we re-run our analyses using the degree of 
information transfer as an alternative proxy for accounting comparability (Yip and Young 
[2012]).  Table 7 reports the results.  We use all observations from the base sample for 
which we are able to obtain earnings announcement data from I/B/E/S and the data 
                                                 
22 Because the enforcement change indicator introduced by Christensen et al. (2013) is not available for all 
countries in our sample, we proxy for enforcement levels using the measure developed by Brown et al. 
(2013) and construct an enforcement change indicator based on their data in the spirit of Christensen et 
al. (2013). However, using the substantive enforcement change indicator by Christensen et al. (2013) 
yields qualitatively similar results albeit for a smaller set of countries. 
23 To test for additional interaction effects, we also estimate a fully saturated version of the model 
presented in Table 6, including the three-way interactions of BPT_ENF_SCORE, COMPLIANCE and 
IFRS_EFFECT and find our inferences to be unchanged. 
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required to estimate our compliance incentives measures.  In particular, the requirement 
of earnings announcement data significantly reduces our sample size.  The final sample is 
based on 3,463 firm-year observations.24  We calculate the unexpected earnings for each 
announcing firm by subtracting the last consensus earnings per share forecast prior the 
reporting date from the reported earnings per share, deflating the result by share price.  
The absolute value of these unexpected earnings is our variable ABS_AF_UE.  The 
cumulative abnormal returns of the non-announcing firms are estimated with market 
models using daily domestic market-wide returns and firm returns starting 185 days prior 
and ending 6 days prior to the reporting dates of the announcing firm.  These non-
announcing firm abnormal returns are averaged over all firms with the same announcing 
firm’s two-digit SIC code having reporting dates subsequent to those of the announcing 
firm.  The absolute value of this variable is our dependent variable ABS_NAF_CAR. 
In line with Yip and Young [2012], if mandatory IFRS adoption has a sizable effect 
on accounting comparability, we expect the link between ABS_AF_UE and 
ABS_NAF_CAR to become more pronounced, indicating that post IFRS adoption, 
earnings reported by announcing firms become more informative for non-announcing 
firms within the same industry. To test this conjecture, we estimate the following model: 
                                                 
24 Our sample is larger than the sample in Yip Young [2012, Table 3 Panel B, right-most column] (939 
observations), first of all, because we study more countries. Secondly, even when we limit our sample 
only to the countries investigated in Yip and Young [2012], our sample is still slightly larger (1,367 
observations). 
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where IFRS is an indicator variable, taking the value of one whenever the firm-year 
observation is by an announcing firm reporting under IFRS, SIZE is measured by the 
natural logarithm of the announcing firm total assets in USD, NUMEST captures the 
number of earnings estimates of the last consensus forecast, and LOSS is an indicator 
variable taking the value of one whenever the announcing firm reports a negative net 
income before extraordinary items. 
Consistent with prior studies that document that the effects of cross-country 
information transfers are limited (Firth, [1996]; Alves et al. [2007]), the explanatory 
power of our model is weak.  The main coefficient of interest, 3, is marginally 
insignificant, (t-value: 1.19, two-sided p-value: 23 %) indicating that, controlling for the 
time trend using a control group, the information transfer effect of mandatory IFRS 
adoption is not significant.  This evidence confirms our main findings using a different 
measure of accounting comparability.25 
                                                 
25  Our results differ from the main findings presented by Yip and Young [2012: Table 3] who document a 
positive impact of IFRS adoption on the degree of information transfer.  A potential reason for this 
divergence might be that we use a difference-in-difference design with a control group of firms from 
non-adopting countries while the analyses in Yip and Young [2013] rely on an interrupted time series 
approach without a control group. 
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In order to see whether firms with larger compliance incentives experience a larger 
information transfer effect induced by the mandatory IFRS adoption, we estimate a 
modified version of model (8): 
(9) 
ܣܤܵ_ܰܣܨ_ܥܣܴ௜,௧
ൌ ෍ߙ௝ܥܱܷܴܰܶ ௝ܻ ൅
௝
෍ߚ௞ܫܰܦܷܴܵܶ ௞ܻ
௞
൅෍߮௧ܻܧܣܴ௧ ൅
௧
ߛଵܣܤܵ_ܣܨ_ܷܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଶܥܱܯܲܮܫܣܰܥܧ_ܨܲܥ௜,௧
൅ ߛଷܫܨܴ ௜ܵ,௧ ൅ ߛସܣܤܵ_ܣܨ_ܷܧ௜,௧ ∗ ܥܱܯܲܮܫܣܰܥܧ_ܨܲܥ௜,௧
൅ ߛହܣܤܵ_ܣܨ_ܷܧ௜,௧ ∗ ܫܨܴ ௜ܵ,௧ ൅ ߛ଺ܣܤܵ_ܣܨ_ܷܧ௜,௧ 	
∗ ܥܱܯܲܮܫܣܰܥܧ_ܨܲܥ௜,௧ ∗ ܫܨܴ ௜ܵ,௧ ൅ ߛ଻ܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߛ଼ܷܰܯܧܵ ௜ܶ,௧
൅ ߛଽܮܱܵ ௜ܵ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧  
,
where COMPLIANCE_FPC is the firm-level first principle component of our compliance 
incentives as discussed in section 3.5.  All other variables are as previously defined.  
Here, our main interest lies with the three-way interaction of ABS_AF_UE, IFRS, and 
COMPLIANCE_FPC.  We find the corresponding coefficient to be positive and 
marginally significant, indicating that firms with larger compliance incentives experience 
larger information transfer effects after mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Taken together, these results corroborate our main findings: The comparability effect 
of mandatory IFRS adoption appears to be marginal on average and centered on firms 
with large compliance incentives. 
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3.8 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES: PRIVATE FIRMS AS A WITHIN-COUNTRY 
CONTROL GROUP 
One inherent limitation of studies investigating the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption is 
that the identification usually relies on control firms form different countries with 
different institutional environments and a treatment effect that is to a large extent 
clustered in time (Christensen et al. [2013]).  While our study makes no exemption with 
regards to the time-clustering of the event, we now address the problem of the control 
sample being from different countries by using local GAAP private firms from the same 
country matched on industry, size and profitability as an alternative control group.26  This 
research design allows for cleaner identification as it holds the jurisdictional environment 
of treatment and control firms constant. 
We use Bureau van Dijk Orbis data to identify suitable private firms.  We employ 
propensity score matching to match public firms with private firms from the same 
country on industry, size, and profitability.  We average the resulting firm pairs by 
country, peer-country, listing status (i.e., public or private), peer firm listing status, 
industry, and pre and post 2004 groups, yielding a sample of 10,744 observations.  Out of 
these observations, 2,776 observations are public-public pairs, 2,628 are private-private 
pairs, and 5,340 are private-public pairs.  The results of the tests are reported in Table 8.  
We use the following model to estimate the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on 
comparability: 
                                                 
26 We thank the reviewer for this suggestion. 
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(10) 
ܥܱܯܲܯ௖௜,௖௝,௦௜,௦௝,௞,௧
ൌ ෍ߜ௖௜ܥܱܷܴܰܶ ௖ܻ௜ ൅
௖௜
෍ߜ௖௝ܲܥܱܷܴܰܶ ௖ܻ௝
௖௝
൅෍߮௞ܫܰܦܷܴܵܶ ௞ܻ ൅
௞
ߛଵܵܯܥܴܶ ௖ܻ௜,௖௝ ൅ ߛଶܷܲܤܮܫܥ௦௜,௦௝
൅ ߛଷܱܲܵܶ_2004௧ ൅ ߛସ	ܵܯܥܴܶ ௖ܻ௜,௖௝ ∗ ܱܲܵܶ_2004௧
൅ ߛହ	ܷܲܤܮܫܥ௦௜,௦௝ ∗ ܱܲܵܶ_2004௧ ൅ ߝ௖௜,௖௝,௦௜,௦௝,௞,௧ 
.
COMPM is either CFCOMP or R_CFCOMP.  PUBLIC takes the value of one if the 
respective observations capture the comparability of public firms and zero otherwise.  
POST_2004 takes the value of one for observations based on the time period 2005-2008, 
and zero otherwise.  All other variables are as previously defined.  Panel A reports the 
results for the tests containing only firm pairs with the same listing status (i.e., either 
public-public or private-private).  This means that observations comparing public to 
private firms are excluded (results for public-private pairs are presented in Panel B). The 
first two columns report the results for all public-public and private-private observations.  
We generally find that public firms and firms from the same country report more 
comparable earnings. While the former result is consistent with public firms having 
greater incentives to comply because they are subject to stronger enforcement (Ball and 
Shivakumar [2005]), the latter result is consistent with the idea that firms sharing the 
same institutional infrastructure tend to have more comparable reporting practices.  In 
addition to that, the analyses conducted using CFCOMP as dependent variable show a 
general decrease in comparability after 2004 while public firms report even more 
comparable earnings relative to private firms in the period post IFRS adoption. Results 
for R_CFCOMP point to the same direction but are not significant. Taken together, we 
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see these findings as consistent with a marginal comparability effect of mandatory IFRS 
adoption.27  
We now turn to the analysis of the moderating impact of compliance incentives on 
the comparability effect.  For this, we partition our public-public firms’ observations by 
their respective levels of compliance incentives.  The third and fourth column of Panel A 
report the results when we exclude public-public observations where firms face high 
compliance incentives form the analysis.  In line with the results of our main tests, we 
find no significant IFRS comparability effect for public firms that face low compliance 
incentives as the coefficient for PUBLIC*POST_2004 becomes negative and 
insignificant.  However, when we exclude the observations based on public firms with 
low compliance incentives (fifth and sixth column of Panel A), we find a strong and 
significant coefficient for the IFRS effect. This effect is also sizable in economic terms as 
indicated by a comparability rank increase of 10.4 percentage points for public firms with 
large compliance incentives. 
We summarize the results of Panel A as confirming that the effect of mandatory 
IFRS adoption on comparability is centered on firms with high compliance incentives. In 
addition, we find a marginally positive comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption 
for European firms when we use private firms from the same country as a control group.  
This finding is consistent with the results from the test using public firms from non-IFRS 
countries as a control group. 
We then use private firm data to test whether comparability between public and 
private firms declines after the mandatory IFRS adoption for public firms.  A reduction in 
comparability could be interpreted as transparency-enhancing if driven by differences 
                                                 
27 While this finding seems to be driven by the comparability of private firms decreasing, the 
comparability of public firms remains more or less constant which we regard as evidence consistent 
with a marginal comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption. 
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between public and private firms becoming more apparent to users of financial statements 
post IFRS adoption.  Such a decline in comparability should affect the comparability 
between public and private firms across all IFRS adopting countries. However, if a 
decline in comparability is only observed when private and public firms come from the 
same country, this would likely be driven by different GAAP regimes (IFRS for public 
and local GAAP for private firms) post 2004. Such an effect would be consistent with a 
potential cost of IFRS adoption since financial statement users now face higher 
information processing costs when comparing public and private firms from the same 
country. 
Panel B of Table 7 reports the results for this test.  For this analysis, we limit our 
sample to observations that measure the comparability between public and private firms.  
Thus, the indicator variable PUBLIC and its interaction with POST_2004 are dropped.  
Our main variables of interest are POST_2004 and the interaction of SMCTRY and 
POST_2004.  The coefficient for POST_2004 indicates that, on average, public firms 
become more comparable to private firms post IFRS adoption.28 This finding is 
inconsistent with the transparency argument outlined above since an increase in 
transparency would require a decrease in comparability across all countries.  The 
coefficient for the interaction of POST_2004 and SMCTRY captures whether, after 
public firms adopt IFRS, public and private firms from the same country become more or 
less comparable.  We find a negative and marginally significant coefficient, indicating 
that after public firms adopt IFRS, they become less comparable to private firms within 
the same country.  Again, this effect is meaningful in economic terms as indicated by a 
rank decrease in comparability of 5 percentage points for public-private firm pairs from 
                                                 
28  Since a control sample of non IFRS-adopting countries is not available for this test, we cannot rule out 
that the coefficient for POST_2004 might be also capturing a general time trend.  
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IFRS adopting countries.  We then test for the joint significance of SMCTRY and 
POST_2004*SMCTRY.  The joint coefficients are not significantly different from zero 
indicating that, post 2004, the accounting information of private and public firms from 
the same country is as comparable as the accounting information of public and private 
firms from two different countries. We cautiously interpret this finding as being 
consistent with a potential cost of IFRS adoption. 
4. Conclusion 
In this study we examine the change in comparability around mandatory IFRS adoption 
and find it to be centered on firms that face high compliance incentives.  Using a broad 
cross-country sample of mandatory IFRS adopting firms, we first document that the 
overall comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption is marginal.  In a second set of 
tests we use a sample of hand-collected IFRS compliance data from German and Italian 
firms and provide evidence that the IFRS compliance of German and Italian firms varies 
systematically with country-, region-, and firm-level incentives.  We then use the 
identified firm-level compliance incentives (auditor type, board independence, and 
governmental ownership) to refine our analysis on the broad cross-country sample and 
find that only firms with high compliance incentives experience an economically and 
statistically significant increase in comparability around IFRS adoption.  Moreover, we 
document that country-level enforcement complements firm-level compliance incentives 
in moderating the comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption.  Lastly, we show 
that post IFRS adoption, the accounting information of public firms adopting IFRS 
becomes less comparable to the information provided by local GAAP private firms from 
the same country. 
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Our results are subject to some important caveats.  First, while we use a 
heterogeneous treatment indicator, a change specification, and a difference-in- 
differences approach with two control samples (public firms from different countries and 
private firms from the same country)  to identify the comparability effect of mandatory 
IFRS adoption, we cannot completely rule out the potential influences of other concurrent 
regulatory changes.  Second, our comparability constructs are noisy and thus capture our 
economic dependent variable of interest with error.  To improve the reliability of our 
findings, we conduct a battery of analyses designed to capture different aspects of our 
dependent variable.  Finally, with respect to external validity, we try to make our results 
as general as possible by basing our inferences on a broad sample of countries for our 
first and third tests of our main analysis.  However, this large sample evidence might give 
rise to internal validity concerns.  While we try to address these concerns by conducting 
an additional test that uses high quality hand-collected data, additional research 
investigating the effects of IFRS adoption using carefully-selected settings optimized for 
causal inference seems warranted. 
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APPENDIX 1: ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION  
AND TEST DESIGN 
 
The concept of comparability is based on a comparison of firm pairs.  In order to assess 
the treatment effect of IFRS adoption on comparability we need to compare sets of firms 
whose level of comparability is likely to be affected by IFRS adoption.  We attempt to 
achieve this goal by comparing firms within the same SIC two-digit industry across 
countries.  Using the DKVCOMP and CFCOMP measures constructed as described in the 
research design section, we observe the average comparability of firms from one country 
(e.g., the U.S.) with firms from another country (e.g., the U.K.), separately for each two-
digit industry group with sufficient data and for the pre and post IFRS regime change 
period.  This procedure yields us a dataset with the following structure: 
COUNTRY PCOUNTRY IND PERIOD GAAP_PROX DKVCOMP CFCOMP
U.K. U.S. 20 PRE -0.167 -0.042 -0.071
U.K. U.S. 20 POST -0.222 -0.046 -0.070
U.K. Germany 20 PRE -0.556 -0.056 -0.111
U.K. Germany 20 POST 0.000 -0.058 -0.094
... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
 
COUNTRY and PCOUNTRY indicate the two countries that are being compared, IND 
stands for the two-digit SIC code of the respective firms.  PERIOD indicates the period 
pre (2001-2004) and post (2005-2008) IFRS adoption.  GAAP_PROX captures the 
country-pair GAAP distance by summing up differences between two countries based on 
the GAAP differences measure presented in Bae et al. [2008: Table 1].  The variable is 
multiplied by minus one and recoded to be distributed between -1 and 0 so that larger 
(less negative) values indicate more similar accounting regimes.  DKVCOMP and 
CFCOMP are our comparability measures.  For both measures, larger (less negative) 
values indicate more comparable financial accounting information.  
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These example data show that the comparability of U.K. firms with U.S. firms can be 
expected to be affected by the adoption of IFRS in the U.K.: After IFRS adoption the 
accounting regime in the U.K. becomes more dissimilar to the accounting regime of the 
U.S. while becoming identical with the accounting regime of Germany.  In order to 
capture this relation, our main treatment variable is the change of GAAP_PROX between 
the 2004 and 2008 periods (IFRS_EFFECT).  While this variable is zero for country pairs 
where neither country has adopted IFRS (our control group), it is different from zero 
whenever at least one country has adopted IFRS (our treatment group). 
As stated in the research design section, our tests are based on the following change 
analysis: 
(A1) 
߂ሺܥܱܯܲܯ௖௜,௖௝,௞ሻ
ൌ෍ߜ௖௜ܥܱܷܴܰܶ ௖ܻ௜ ൅
௖௜
෍ߜ௖௝ܲܥܱܷܴܰܶ ௖ܻ௝
௖௝
൅෍߮௞ܫܰܦܷܴܵܶ ௞ܻ ൅
௞
ߛଵܵܯܥܴܶ ௖ܻ௜,௖௝
൅ ߛଶܫܨܴܵ_ܧܨܨܧܥ ௖ܶ௜,௖௝ ൅ ߝ௖௜,௖௝,௞  
,
Since the according samples are organized by country, peer-country and industry, we can 
use country fixed effects for both country dimensions as well as industry fixed effects in 
our regressions.  Note that we do not use the interaction of country and peer-country 
fixed effects since this would effectively remove from the system all the variation of 
IFRS_EFFECT or GAAP_PROXIMITY that we need for identification. The country-
level fixed effects allow us to effectively control for country-level institutions that might 
affect the overall rigidness of a country’s accounting regime (such as enforcement, 
efficiency of the auditing process, etc.).  This approach is conceptually similar to an 
estimation of a firm-year panel using firm and year fixed effects.  Using firm and year 
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fixed effects removes the average cross-sectional effects and the average time effects 
from the system. Like in this standard setting our identification comes from the 
interaction of country and peer-country and not from the average effects of country and 
peer-country per se.  
Using IFRS_EFFECT as our heterogeneous treatment enhances the power of our 
tests compared to a traditional difference-in-differences setting where the treatment is 
modeled as a binary state variable.  In addition, collapsing time series data in a pre- and 
post-period avoids the problem of inconsistent standard errors caused by serial correlated 
outcomes  (Bertrand et al. [2004]). 
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APPENDIX 2: INSTRUMENT FOR IFRS COMPLIANCE TEST 
The objective of the data collection process is to collect data about the level of compliance with 
IFRS for German and Italian firms.  Based on prior literature, we expect compliance to be 
particularly problematic whenever local GAAP deviates significantly from IFRS. In addition, 
prior research has documented disclosure compliance to be easier to assess than measurement 
compliance.  Thus, we design our data collection instrument focusing on disclosure rules and 
those accounting issues where German and Italian GAAP exhibit sizeable differences between 
each other and IFRS.  For this reason, we identify the subset of IFRS that covers those specific 
accounting issues.  Measurement and disclosure compliance are assessed via a number of “check-
list”-type of questions directly drawn from each of the surveyed accounting standards. Where 
applicable, to construct the compliance score we assign the value of “1” (“0”) in case the 
company meets (does not meet) the compliance threshold level for the standard investigated.  We 
express our compliance index (CSCORE) as a percentage.  If a firm satisfies all the applicable 
disclosure compliance questions on the checklist, the compliance index is equal to 100%. Further 
details about the construction of the instrument and the data collection process are provided in the 
online Appendix to this paper available at the following link: http://www.wiwi.hu-
berlin.de/rewe/research/cg_online_app.pdf. 
 
Accounting 
standard 
 
 
 
Accounting topic covered  
 
 
 
Measurement 
compliance 
 
 (Number of  
questions) 
Disclosure 
compliance 
 
(Number of 
questions) 
IFRS 2 Share-based payments 1 3 
IAS 11 Construction contracts 1 3 
IAS 17 Leases 1 3 
IAS 19 Employee benefits 1 4 
IAS 33 Earnings per share 0 4 
IAS 36 Impairment of assets 2 3 
IAS 38 Intangible assets 2 3 
IAS 39 Financial Instrument 5 3 
Total  13 26 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
 
This Table reports the base sample and descriptive statistics for our dependent and independent variables.  The balanced sample of firm-year observations 
that is used to construct the comparability metrics is presented in Panel A.  Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest.  In Panel 
C Pearson (Spearman) correlations are above (below) the diagonal.  Significant correlations at the 1% (two-sided) appear in bold print.  DKVCOMP is a 
comparability measure based on De Franco et al. [2011], where firm-to-firm comparability is assessed by the similarity of firm-level earnings on return 
regressions.  CFCOMP is a similar construct, where firm-to-firm comparability is assessed by the similarity of firm-level total accruals on cash flow 
regressions.  R_(c) indicates the ranked version of our measurement c.  The calculation of both metrics is explained in detail in the paper.  Variables are 
averaged at the country, peer-country, and industry level.  SMCTRY is a binary variable taking the value of one if country and peer-country are the same 
and zero otherwise. GAAP_PROX measures the proximity between GAAP regimes, based on the data used by Bae et al. [2008]. 
Panel A: Sample Composition 
IFRS Adopting Countries  Non-Adopting Countries
  Pre 2005  Post 2005     Pre 2005  Post 2005  
Country Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent Total Country Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent Total 
Australia 1,380 0.16 1,380 0.16 2,760 Brazil 492 0.02 492 0.02 984 
Denmark 244 0.03 244 0.03 488 Canada 1,408 0.05 1,408 0.05 2,816 
Finland 324 0.04 324 0.04 648 Chile 424 0.01 424 0.01 848 
France 1,344 0.16 1,344 0.16 2,688 China 548 0.02 548 0.02 1,096 
Germany 456 0.05 456 0.05 912 India 824 0.03 824 0.03 1648 
Greece 588 0.07 588 0.07 1,176 Indonesia 628 0.02 628 0.02 1,256 
Italy 444 0.05 444 0.05 888 Japan 9,680 0.31 9,680 0.31 19,360 
Netherlands 280 0.03 280 0.03 560 Malaysia 1,640 0.05 1,640 0.05 3280 
Norway 240 0.03 240 0.03 480 Mexico 240 0.01 240 0.01 480 
Philippines 340 0.04 340 0.04 680 Pakistan 232 0.01 232 0.01 464 
South Africa 524 0.06 524 0.06 1,048 South Korea 2,108 0.07 2,108 0.07 4,216 
Spain 260 0.03 260 0.03 520 Taiwan 1,416 0.05 1,416 0.05 2832 
Sweden 616 0.07 616 0.07 1,232 Thailand 836 0.03 836 0.03 1,672 
United Kingdom 1,580 0.18 1,580 0.18 3,160 Turkey 260 0.01 260 0.01 520 
   United States 10,036 0.33 10,036 0.33 20,072 
Total 8,620 1.00 8,620 1.00 17,240 Total 30,772 1.00 30,772 1.00 61,544 
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Panel B: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable N Mean SD Min 25% Median 75% Max
DKVCOMP 16,825 -0.188 0.125 -0.682 -0.243 -0.159 -0.097 -0.026
R_DKVCOMP 16,825 -0.576 0.160 -0.969 -0.683 -0.571 -0.467 -0.203
CFCOMP 16,825 -0.074 0.042 -0.265 -0.091 -0.065 -0.046 -0.016
R_CFCOMP 16,825 -0.528 0.135 -0.908 -0.609 -0.526 -0.440 -0.208
SMCTRY 16,825 0.033 0.178 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
GAAP_PROX 16,825 -0.470 0.192 -1.000 -0.611 -0.444 -0.333 0.000
Panel C: Correlations 
  A B C D E F
A: DKVCOMP  0.803 0.354 0.256 0.028 -0.042
B: R_DKVCOMP 0.840  0.298 0.318 0.047 -0.029
C: CFCOMP 0.306 0.292  0.732 0.020 0.014
D: R_CFCOMP 0.252 0.332 0.790  0.044 0.036
E: SMCNTRY 0.035 0.043 0.021 0.041  0.452
F: GAAP_PROX -0.050 -0.035 0.009 0.032 0.310  
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TABLE 2 
 
Comparability Tests 
This Table reports the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on the comparability of financial accounting 
information.  DKVCOMP is a comparability measure based on De Franco et al. [2011], where firm-to-firm 
comparability is assessed by the similarity of firm-level earnings on return regressions.  CFCOMP is a similar 
construct, where firm-to-firm comparability is assessed by the similarity of firm-level total accruals on cash 
flow regressions.  R_(c) indicates the ranked version of our measurement c.  The calculation of both metrics is 
explained in detail in the paper.  Variables are averaged at the country, peer-country, and industry level.  
SMCTRY is a binary variable taking the value of one if country and peer-country are the same and zero 
otherwise. GAAP_PROX measures the proximity between GAAP regimes, based on the data used by Bae et al. 
[2008].  In Panel B, the dependent variable is the change in comparability measures relative to the pre IFRS 
period.  IFRS_EFFECT is the change in GAAP_PROX caused by IFRS adoption. Robust standard errors 
clustered by country, peer-country, and industry are reported in parentheses below the coefficients.  ***/**/* 
marks two-sided significance at the 1/5/10% level.  
Panel A: Comparability Analysis Pre IFRS (N=16,825) 
  Model (5)   Model (5)  Model (5)   Model (5) 
Dependent Variable DKVCOMP   R_DKVCOMP  CFCOMP   R_CFCOMP 
Intercept -0.103***  -0.489***  -0.123***  -0.556*** 
 (0.021)  (0.054)  (0.040)  (0.127) 
SMCTRY 0.015***  0.030***  0.002  0.015*** 
 (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.002)  (0.006) 
GAAP_PROX 0.002  0.018**  0.006***  0.028*** 
 (0.006)   (0.008)   (0.002)   (0.007) 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer-country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2 0.258  0.227  0.290  0.155 
Panel B: Comparability Analysis IFRS Effect (N=16,418) 
  Model (6)  Model (6)  Model (6)   Model (6) 
Parameter DKVCOMP)  R_DKVCOMP)  CFCOMP)   R_CFCOMP)
Intercept 0.025  -0.037  0.030  0.112 
 (0.029)  (0.113)  (0.026)  (0.126) 
SMCTRY -0.012**  -0.019***  -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.002)  (0.006) 
IFRS_EFFECT -0.002  0.012**  0.002  0.014** 
 (0.005)  (0.007)   (0.002)   (0.007) 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer-country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2 0.204  0.194  0.096  0.074 
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TABLE 3 
IFRS Compliance Tests 
This Table reports average IFRS measurement and disclosure compliance scores (a value of one 
indicating full compliance) for German and Italian firms.  Firms included in these samples are at 
least listed since 2004 and have their 2006 group financial reports available either on the respective 
investor relation section of the respective website or on the respective stock exchange website.  The 
instrument utilized to evaluate the IFRS measurement and disclosure compliance is available in 
Appendix 2.  SD stands for standard deviation.  A t-test (Wilcoxon signed rank test) is used to test 
for differences in means (medians).  ***/**/* marks two-sided significance at the 1/5/10% level.  
Panel A: Accounting Measurement Compliance 
 
  Germany Late  Italy      
Standard   n Mean Median SD    n Mean Median SD  t-value Z-score
IFRS 2 15 1.000 1.000 0.000 67 0.925 1.000 0.265  1.09 1.07
IAS 11 20 1.000 1.000 0.000 48 1.000 1.000 0.000 n/a n/a
IAS 17 75 0.987 1.000 0.115 125 0.992 1.000 0.089 -0.37 -0.36
IAS 19 111 0.991 1.000 0.095 153 0.967 1.000 0.178 1.27 1.27
IAS 36 120 0.950 1.000 0.176 153 0.964 1.000 0.153 -0.70 -0.78
IAS 38 135 0.930 1.000 0.185 152 0.974 1.000 0.138 -2.30** -2.81***
IAS 39 107 0.898 1.000 0.217  132 0.978 1.000 0.100  -3.77*** -3.90***
 
 
Panel B: Disclosure Compliance 
 
  Germany Late  Italy      
Standard   n Mean Median SD    N Mean Median SD  t-value Z-score 
IFRS 2 17 0.559 0.333 0.328 66 0.828 1.000 0.327  -3.03*** -3.23*** 
IAS 11 21 0.810 1.000 0.249 49 0.673 0.667 0.357 1.59 1.38 
IAS 17 120 0.772 1.000 0.343 125 0.613 0.667 0.370 3.48*** 3.67*** 
IAS 19 121 0.607 0.750 0.318 153 0.657 0.750 0.320 -1.27 -1.49 
IAS 33 136 0.827 1.000 0.231 153 0.840 1.000 0.273 -0.42 -1.77* 
IAS 36 105 0.324 0.333 0.334 152 0.471 0.333 0.403 -3.09*** -2.88*** 
IAS 38 135 0.877 1.000 0.240 153 0.741 1.000 0.332 3.93*** 3.58*** 
IAS 39 107 0.460 0.500 0.305  131 0.691 1.000 0.384  -5.06*** -5.35*** 
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TABLE 4 
Determinants of Compliance 
The 2006 German and Italian samples contain observations that fulfill the data requirements for 
estimating the models of Panel C.  In Panel C, ITALY is a dummy variable coded one if the 
respective observation stems from an Italian firm and zero otherwise.  CSCORE is average disclosure 
compliance, calculated using the instrument presented in Appendix 2. SIZE is the natural logarithm 
of total assets.  ROA is return on assets, calculated by dividing earnings before interest and taxes by 
beginning-of-fiscal year total assets.  MTB is market capitalization divided by book value of equity.  
FREQ_LOSSES is the frequency of losses, defined as the proportion of the previous five fiscal years 
in which the firm reported negative earnings.  INDEP_BOARD is a dummy variable for board 
independence that, for the Italian sample is coded one if the number of independent directors divided 
by the total number of board members is above the full sample mean and zero otherwise, and, for the 
German sample is coded one if the head of the supervisory board has not been the former chief 
executive officer of the respective firm and zero otherwise.  INSTOWN is a dummy variable 
indicating significant institutional ownership (above 2%) in the firm.  GOVOWN is a dummy 
variable indicating whether a governmental body has a stake in the respective firm.  FAMBUS is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the respective firm is controlled by a managing family.  BIG4 is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the financial statements of the respective firm have been audited 
by a dominant audit supplier. LD_REGION is a dummy variable indicating whether the respective 
German (Italian) firm is domiciled in the eastern regions of Germany (southern regions of Italy).  
Robust standard errors clustered by industry are reported in parentheses below the coefficients.  In 
Panel A, SD stands for Standard Deviation.  In Panel B, Pearson (Spearman) correlations are above 
(below) the diagonal.  Bold typeset indicates two-sided significance below the 5 % level.  The models 
of Panel C are estimated using ordinary least squares and industry fixed effects.  Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients.  ***/**/* marks two-sided significance at 
the 1/5/10% level.  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
German 2006 Sample (n=136)
Variable Mean SD 25 % Median 75 %
CSCORE 0.669 0.178 0.579 0.694 0.786
SIZE 11.901 1.717 10.864 11.816 12.900
ROA 0.043 0.108 0.002 0.038 0.081
MTB 1.965 2.826 0.981 1.529 2.573
FREQ_LOSSES 0.281 0.296 0.000 0.200 0.600
INDEP_BOARD_D 0.515  
INSTOWN 0.426  
GOVOWN 0.044  
FAMBUS 0.213  
BIG4 0.493  
LD_REGION 0.059  
 
  
 50 
TABLE 4 – Continued 
 
Italian 2006 Sample (n=153) 
Variable Mean SD 25 % Median 75 %
CSCORE 0.678 0.227 0.522 0.700 0.870
SIZE 13.089 1.801 11.807 12.817 14.225
ROA 0.016 0.067 -0.012 0.020 0.049
MTB 2.324 2.822 1.314 1.837 2.615
FREQ_LOSSES 0.344 0.371 0.000 0.200 0.600
INDEP_BOARD_D 0.392     
INSTOWN 0.386     
GOVOWN 0.137     
FAMBUS 0.601     
BIG4 0.863     
LD_REGION 0.033     
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Panel B: Correlations 
German 2006 Sample 
 A B C D E F G H I J K
A: CSCORE  0.222 -0.064 0.031 0.012 0.275 0.091 0.071 -0.171 0.207 -0.027
B: SIZE 0.328  0.011 -0.012 -0.077 0.118 -0.085 0.368 -0.071 0.140 0.016
C: ROA -0.013 0.081  0.199 -0.291 -0.127 -0.080 0.014 0.079 -0.098 0.018
D: MTB 0.067 0.212 0.235  -0.176 -0.097 0.086 0.036 0.006 0.149 -0.004
E: FREQ_LOSSES -0.021 -0.444 -0.404 -0.216  0.076 0.002 -0.156 -0.191 -0.127 0.059
F: INDEP_BOARD 0.305 0.244 -0.011 0.133 0.052  -0.025 0.065 -0.141 -0.014 -0.070
G: INSTOWN 0.102 0.152 -0.078 0.000 -0.012 -0.025  -0.185 -0.449 0.251 0.037
H: GOVOWN 0.038 0.199 0.020 0.116 -0.157 0.065 -0.185  -0.024 0.075 -0.054
I: FAMBUS -0.180 0.011 0.098 -0.037 -0.202 -0.141 -0.449 -0.024  -0.154 0.022
J: BIG4 0.206 0.338 -0.069 0.183 -0.120 -0.014 0.251 0.075 -0.154  0.066
K: LD_REGION 0.016 0.025 0.064 -0.053 0.110 -0.070 0.037 -0.054 0.022 0.066  
Italian 2006 Sample 
 A B C D E F G H I J K
A: CSCORE  0.462 0.283 0.112 -0.227 0.147 0.244 -0.042 0.071 0.302 -0.315
B: SIZE 0.439  0.222 -0.114 -0.412 0.072 0.204 0.324 -0.127 0.325 -0.122
C: ROA 0.284 0.311  0.040 -0.610 -0.157 0.206 0.065 0.153 0.127 -0.103
D: MTB 0.190 0.036 0.206  0.046 0.145 0.169 -0.012 -0.104 0.019 -0.015
E: FREQ_LOSSES -0.199 -0.406 -0.714 -0.115  0.035 -0.119 -0.268 -0.138 -0.266 0.147
F: INDEP_BOARD 0.141 0.044 -0.089 0.139 0.036  0.106 0.146 -0.057 -0.108 0.003
G: INSTOWN 0.239 0.228 0.208 0.260 -0.122 0.106  -0.004 -0.041 0.160 -0.070
H: GOVOWN -0.040 0.264 0.118 0.008 -0.269 0.146 -0.004  -0.490 0.159 0.034
I: FAMBUS 0.085 -0.079 0.135 -0.094 -0.148 -0.057 -0.041 -0.490  -0.092 -0.076
J: BIG4 0.281 0.343 0.161 0.034 -0.236 -0.108 0.160 0.159 -0.092  -0.034
K: LD_REGION -0.270 -0.100 -0.098 -0.030 0.133 0.003 -0.070 0.034 -0.076 -0.034  
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Panel C: Multivariate Analyses  
    CSCORE 
  Model (7) 
Parameter   Predicted Sign German Sample   Italian Sample   Pooled Sample 
ITALY     -0.345 
      (0.200) 
SIZE +  0.047*** 0.056***  0.044*** 
    (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
ITALY*SIZE     0.013 
      (0.012) 
ROA +/-  0.018  0.801***  0.014 
    (0.212)  (0.215)  (0.199) 
ITALY*ROA     0.809*** 
      (0.222) 
MTB +  0.001  0.008**  0.001 
    (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.005) 
ITALY*MTB     0.007 
      (0.006) 
FREQ_LOSSES +  0.068  0.090*  0.076 
    (0.079)  (0.042)  (0.073) 
ITALY*FREQ_LOSSES     0.018 
      (0.105) 
INDEP_BOARD_D +  0.070**  0.083*  0.066*** 
    (0.024)  (0.040)  (0.019) 
ITALY*INDEP_BOARD    0.015 
     (0.034) 
INSTOWN +/-  0.017  0.015  0.000 
    (0.026)  (0.047)  (0.026) 
ITALY*INSTOWN    0.026 
     (0.056) 
GOVOWN +/-  0.043**  -0.055**  0.029* 
    (0.014)  (0.022)  (0.013) 
ITALY*GOVOWN    -0.087** 
     (0.034) 
FAMBUS -  -0.011  0.007  -0.030 
    (0.041)  (0.012)  (0.046) 
ITALY*FAMBUS    0.042 
     (0.054) 
BIG4 +  0.033*  0.140**  0.033* 
    (0.016)  (0.042)  (0.017) 
ITALY*BIG4    0.109* 
     (0.057) 
LD_REGION -  -0.010  -0.278***  -0.013 
    (0.042)  (0.069)  (0.042) 
ITALY*LD_REGION    -0.264*** 
       (0.062) 
Industry fixed effects   Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  136  153  289 
R²   0.307  0.466  0.399 
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TABLE 5 
Comparability Effects Moderated by Compliance Determinants 
This Table reports the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on the comparability of financial accounting information, moderated by 
COMPLIANCE, a (0, 0.5, 1)-ranked variable based on COMPLIANCE_FPC.  COMPLIANCE _FPC is the firm-level first principal component of 
a set of variables that are likely to determine the compliance of compared firms.  The set of variables used to calculate COMPLIANCE _FPC are 
BIG4, INDEP_BOARD and GOVOWN.  BIG4 takes a value of one when a firm has been audited by a dominant audit supplier and zero otherwise.  
INDEP_BOARD is the percentage of independent board members.  GOVOWN is a dummy variable indicating whether a local governmental body 
has a stake in the respective firm.  DKVCOMP is a comparability measure based on De Franco et al. [2011], where firm-to-firm comparability is 
assessed by the similarity of firm-level earnings on return regressions.  CFCOMP is a similar construct, where firm-to-firm comparability is 
assessed by the similarity of firm-level earnings on cash flow regressions.  R_(c) indicates the ranked version of our measurement c.  The 
calculation of both metrics is explained in detail in the paper.  Variables are averaged at the country, peer-country, and industry level.  SMCTRY is 
a binary variable taking the value of one if country and peer-country are the same and zero otherwise. GAAP_PROX measures the proximity 
between GAAP regimes, based on the data used by Bae et al. [2008].  The estimated models are interacted versions of models (5) and (6).  In Panel 
A, Pearson (Spearman) correlations for the firm-pair-level sample are above (below) the diagonal.  In Panel C, the dependent variable is the change 
in comparability measures relative to the pre IFRS period.  IFRS_EFFECT is the change in GAAP_PROX caused by IFRS adoption. Robust 
standard errors clustered by country, peer-country, and industry are reported in parentheses below the coefficients.  p-value total IFRS_EFFECT 
reports the two-sided p-value of a Wald F-test that tests whether the sum of the coefficients for IFRS_EFFECT and 
IFRS_EFFECT*COMPLIANCE is significantly different from zero, effectively testing whether there is a significant comparability effect of IFRS 
adoption for the firm pairs in the largest compliance group.  Robust standard errors clustered by country, peer-country, and industry are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficients ***/**/* marks two-sided significance at the 1/5/10% level.  
 
Panel A: Correlations 
  A B C D E F G H I
A: DKVCOMP 0.808 0.221 0.201 0.220 0.083 0.072 0.131 0.127
B: R_DKVCOMP 0.981 0.200 0.217 0.239 0.070 0.084 0.157 0.144
C: CFCOMP 0.212 0.195 0.855 0.019 0.013 -0.004 -0.010 -0.010
D: R_CFCOMP 0.207 0.216 0.973 0.013 0.002 -0.005 0.002 -0.010
E: SIZE 0.251 0.240 0.011 0.013 0.239 0.183 0.641 0.539
F: BIG4 0.082 0.071 0.010 0.003 0.236 0.055 0.208 0.458
G: INDEP_BOARD 0.091 0.084 -0.009 -0.006 0.182 0.054 0.169 0.457
H: GOVOWN 0.154 0.157 -0.012 0.001 0.640 0.205 0.169 0.738
I: COMPLIANCE_FPC 0.151 0.145 -0.013 -0.010 0.538 0.452 0.455 0.737
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Panel B: Comparability Analysis Pre IFRS (N=19,222) 
  Model (5*)   Model (5*)  Model (5*)   Model (5*) 
Dependent Variable DKVCOMP   R_DKVCOMP   CFCOMP   R_CFCOMP 
Intercept -0.145***  -0.679***  -0.098***  -0.808*** 
 (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.003)  (0.011) 
SMCTRY 0.028***  0.041***  0.008***  0.041*** 
 (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.003)  (0.009) 
GAAP_PROX -0.011  -0.002  -0.001  -0.004 
 (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.004)  (0.011) 
COMPLIANCE 0.089***  0.124***  0.018***  0.074*** 
 (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.002)  (0.008) 
SMCTRY * COMPLIANCE -0.022**  -0.002  -0.007*  -0.035*** 
 (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.004)  (0.012) 
GAAP_PROX *COMPLIANCE 0.026**  0.020  0.011***  0.072*** 
 (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.005)  (0.015) 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer-country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2 0.327  0.308  0.335  0.166 
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Panel C: Comparability Analysis IFRS Effect (N=18,355) 
 Model (6*)  Model (6*)  Model (6*)  Model (6*) 
Dependent Variable (DKVCOMP)  (R_DKVCOMP)  (CFCOMP)  (R_CFCOMP)
Intercept -0.047***  -0.221***  -0.025***  -0.063*** 
 (0.008)  (0.013)  (0.003)  (0.011) 
SMCTRY -0.015**  -0.019*  0.000  -0.001 
 (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.003)  (0.009) 
IFRS_EFFECT -0.002  -0.007  -0.007**  -0.011 
 (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.003)  (0.010) 
COMPLIANCE -0.012***  0.029***  0.005***  0.010*** 
 (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.004) 
SMCTRY *COMPLIANCE 0.009  -0.000  -0.001  -0.005 
 (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.003)  (0.013) 
IFRS_EFFECT*COMPLIANCE 0.014*  0.036***  0.015***  0.052*** 
 (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.003)  (0.013) 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer-country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
p-value total IFRS_EFFECT 0.032  0.003  0.000  0.000 
R2 0.233  0.216  0.095  0.073 
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TABLE 6 
 
The Role of Enforcement 
This Table reports the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the comparability of financial accounting information, moderated by compliance 
incentives as well as by levels and changes in enforcement. BPT_ENF_SCORE is a country-level proxy for the quality of enforcement as 
developed in Brown et al. [2013]. All other variables are as previously defined. Robust standard errors clustered by country, peer-country, and 
industry are reported in parentheses below the coefficients.  Robust standard errors clustered by country, peer-country, and industry are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficients. ***/**/* marks two-sided significance at the 1/5/10% level.  
Model (6*) Model (6*) Model (6*) Model (6*)
Dependent Variable (DKVCOMP)   (R_DKVCOMP)   (CFCOMP)    (R_CFCOMP)
Intercept 0.023*** -0.092*** -0.019*** -0.052***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.002) (0.006)
SMCTRY -0.008 -0.017** 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.008) (0.002) (0.006)
BPT_ENF_SCORE -0.071*** -0.107*** -0.009*** -0.014*
(0.006) (0.009) (0.002) (0.008)
(BPT ENF SCORE) 0.111** 0.245*** -0.012 -0.137**
(0.046) (0.066) (0.016) (0.059)
COMPLIANCE -0.011*** 0.027*** 0.004*** 0.007*
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003)
IFRS_EFFECT -0.082*** -0.125*** -0.021*** -0.088***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.003) (0.012)
BPT_ENF_SCORE*IFRS_EFFECT 0.167*** 0.198*** 0.032*** 0.129***
(0.020) (0.030) (0.008) (0.025)
(BPT ENF SCORE)*IFRS EFFECT -0.088 -0.043 -0.014 0.209
(0.110) (0.159) (0.040) (0.143)
COMPLIANCE*IFRS_EFFECT 0.004 0.036*** 0.016*** 0.061***
  (0.008) (0.014) (0.003) (0.012)
Country fixed effects No No No No
Peer-country fixed effects  No No No No
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 18,355 18,355 18,355 18,355 
R2 0.081 0.085 0.061 0.045
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TABLE 7 
 
Information Transfer Test 
This table reports the results of the information transfer test. The test captures the extent to which the 
absolute unexpected earnings of an announcing firm affect the short-window abnormal stock returns of 
non-announcing firms within the same industry. The dependent variable ABS_NAF_CAR is the 
average absolute cumulative abnormal three-day return of all non-announcing firms within the same 
two-digit SIC industry having announcing dates after the one of the announcing firms. ABS_AF_UE 
measures the absolute unexpected earnings of the announcing firm and is calculated as actual EPS 
minus the last prior fiscal year end mean forecasted EPS deflated by stock price as reported in I/B/E/S.  
COMPLIANCE_FPC is the firm-level first principal component of a set of the identified set of 
compliance determinants. IFRS is an indicator variable, taking the value of one whenever the firm-year 
observation is by an announcing firm reporting under IFRS. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. NUMEST is the number of yearly EPS forecasts available before the fiscal year end. LOSS is 
an indicator variable, taking the value of one if the announcing firm reports a negative net income 
before extraordinary items. The coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares with robust 
standard errors clustered by announcing firm. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficients.  ***/**/* marks two-sided significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
 
Model (8) Model (9) 
Dependent Variable ABS_NAF_CAR ABS_NAF_CAR 
Intercept 4.355*** 4.334*** 
(0.407) (0.419) 
ABS_AF_UE 0.144 0.369 
(0.190) (0.263) 
COMPLIANCE_FPC -0.030 
(0.110) 
IFRS -0.569*** -0.580*** 
(0.141) (0.141) 
ABS_AF_UE*COMPLIANCE_FPC -0.443 
(0.442) 
ABS_AF_UE*IFRS 2.637 -1.587 
(2.214) (3.218) 
ABS_AF_UE*COMPLIANCE_FPC*IFRS 7.493* 
(3.994) 
SIZE -0.018 -0.014 
(0.026) (0.027) 
NUMEST -0.013 -0.013 
(0.008) (0.008) 
LOSS 0.084 0.085 
  (0.097)   (0.098) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes 
N 3,463 3,463 
R2  0.081  0.082 
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TABLE 8 
 
Comparability Tests with a Private Firm Control Group 
This Table reports the results of model (10) to investigate the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on the comparability of public firms, compared 
with a propensity score matched sample of private firms from the same country. CFCOMP is a comparability measure in the spirit of De Franco et 
al. [2011], where firm-to-firm comparability is assessed by the similarity of firm-level earnings on cash flow regressions.  R_CFCOMP indicates 
the ranked version of CFCOMP.  The calculation of CFCOMP is explained in detail in the paper.  Variables are averaged at the country, peer-
country, listing status (public or private), time period, and industry level.  SMCTRY is a binary variable taking the value of one if country and 
peer-country are the same and zero otherwise. PUBLIC indicates that the respective observation is based on publicly listed firms. POST_2004 is an 
indicator variable taking the value of one for observations after 2004. Robust standard errors clustered by country, peer-country, and industry are 
reported in parentheses below the coefficients.  ***/**/* marks two-sided significance at the 1/5/10% level.  
Panel A: Comparability for Firm Pairs with Same Listing Status (i.e., either Public-Public or Private-Private Pairs) 
 All public and private observations  
Public observations with high 
compliance incentives excluded  
Public observations with low 
compliance incentives excluded 
Dependent Variable CFCOMP  R_CFCOMP  CFCOMP   R_CFCOMP  CFCOMP  R_CFCOMP 
Intercept -0.140*** -0.504***  -0.142***  -0.497***  -0.157***  -0.539*** 
(0.005) (0.013)  (0.005)  (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.017) 
SMCTRY 0.006** 0.026***  0.003  0.016  0.006  0.029*** 
(0.003) (0.009)  (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.004)  (0.011) 
PUBLIC 0.024*** 0.077***  0.011***  0.033***  0.032***  0.108*** 
 (0.002) (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.009)  (0.003)  (0.010) 
POST_2004 -0.002*** -0.006  -0.002  -0.008  -0.002  -0.006 
(0.002) (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
SMCTRY*POST_2004 -0.005 -0.014  -0.003  0.000  -0.005  -0.018 
(0.003) (0.010)  (0.004)  (0.012)  (0.004)  (0.012) 
PUBLIC*POST_2004 0.004*** 0.008  0.002  -0.005  0.013***  0.042*** 
  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.003)   (0.009)  (0.003)  (0.009) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Peer-country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,404 5,404  3,498  3,498  3,540  3,540 
R2 0.256 0.139  0.257  0.139  0.308  0.225 
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TABLE 8 – Continued 
Panel B: Comparability for Firm Pairs with Different Listing Status (i.e., Public-Private Pairs)  
  Model (8) Model (8) 
Dependent Variable CFCOMP R_CFCOMP 
Intercept -0.154*** -0.535*** 
(0.005) (0.013) 
SMCTRY 0.008**  0.031*** 
 (0.003)  (0.011) 
POST_2004 0.004*** 0.009*** 
 (0.001)  (0.003) 
SMCTRY*POST_2004 -0.007* -0.020* 
  (0.004)   (0.012) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Peer-country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
p-value SMCTRY Effect Post-IFRS 0.790  0.546 
N 5,340 5,340 
R2 0.201   0.088 
 
 
